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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE QUARTET*
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
We are not done with Professor Schwartz. In another life, when I
was a member of the Appellate Division, Second Department, I
recall a case involving the Town of Oyster Bay in which there was
an attack on some decision made by the Town Board of Oyster
Bay. 1 The town decided to send garbage west and to pay the cost
for transporting a large trailer full of garbage to landfills in Indiana,
Ohio, and the mines in Pennsylvania. The plan was attacked as
being a waste of public funds, and as I recall, issue was taken with
the amount of money involved in shipping the garbage that way.
Subsequently, in a more recent life, when I was a member of the
Temporary State Commission on Tax Reduction in Long Island, I
looked at the numbers and budgetary problems relative to garbage
disposal faced by towns in both Nassau and Suffolk Counties.
When I was town attorney, a very long time ago in Huntington, the
largest budgetary item was the highway department. Today, the
largest budgetary item in most towns in Nassau and Suffolk, and I
am sure in a lot of other places, is disposal of solid waste.
The Supreme Court has interjected a number of decisions this
past Term which have affected the choices municipalities can
make. It is most remarkable that, in many places, it is cheaper to
send those trailer trucks to Indiana or anywhere in the midwest,
than to bum the waste in the locality where an incinerator exists.
Of course, this relates to the cost of the incinerator, the original
cost of the bonds that have to be paid, as well as to their interest
and maintenance. Therefore, since the private carters who collect
* A similar version of Professor Schwartz's lecture appeared in the New
York Law Journal on October 18, 1994. The author expresses appreciation for
the valuable assistance of Elizabeth Rogak, Research Editor of the Touro Lma
Review.
1. Incorporated Village of Brookville v. Colby, 108 A.D.2d 724, 484
N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't 1985).
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most of the garbage in Nassau and Suffolk must pay fees for
dumping at the local landfills, they transport it to areas outside the
locality which do not charge a fee. Those fees are called tipping
fees and they are very important to the economy of running an
incinerator. This is because these fees go to help pay for the bonds
and the maintenance. To the extent the carters are able to transport
their garbage elsewhere and dispose of it at a lower cost, the town
loses out on the uncollected tipping fees.
In a number of cases this year, the Supreme Court has helped
with some issues. The fear by those who were shipping the garbage
west was that one of these days, other states would stop taking it.
Thus, the question is raised; "if we do not have an incinerator,
what are we going to do when no one will accept our trash?" The
response is - let us spend 100 million or 200 million dollars and
build an incinerator to avoid such a prospect.
Now, we will hear again from Professor Schwartz on some
interstate commerce cases.
Professor Martin A. Schwartz:
INTRODUCTION
The last thing that Judge Lazer said saved me because I thought
he was going to define my subject as garbage. Instead, he couched
it in terms of the Commerce Clause. This leaves a little dignity to
the subject.
Last Term, the United States Supreme Court rendered four
decisions in which state or local laws which discriminated against
out-of-state commerce were found to violate the Commerce
Clause. The Court invalidated: a New York town's "flow control"
ordinance requiring all solid waste to be processed at a designated
transfer station before leaving the municipality, C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown;2 an Oregon statute imposing higher
surcharges on the disposal of solid waste from outside the state
than within the state, Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of
2. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
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Environmental Quality;3 a Missouri use tax on goods purchased
out-of-state, Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman;4 and a
Massachusetts "give back" scheme that, while imposing an equal
assessment on milk sold by in and out-of-state dealers to
Massachusetts retailers, distributed the proceeds solely to
Massachusetts dairy farmers, West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy.5
These decisions raise fundamental questions concerning the
constitutional power of state and local government to devise
polices for combating their environmental and fiscal problems.
I. RESTRICTIONS ON STATE AUTONOMY UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
Before proceeding to last Term's Commerce Clause quartet,
some background is in order. The Commerce Clause, as written,
grants power to Congress to "regulate Commerce... among the
several states . ."6 As construed by the United States Supreme
Court, however, the Commerce Clause also operates as a limitation
on the power of the states to regulate out-of-state commerce. "This
negative (or "dormant") aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits
economic protectionism -- that is, regulatory measures designed to
benefit in-state economic measures by burdening out-of-state
competitors." 7
3. 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994).
4. 114 S. Ct. 1815 (1994).
5. 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause grants Congress
power "[tio regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.
7. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988). In
New Energy, the Court held that an Ohio statute discriminated against interstate
commerce since other states were not treated the same unless they offered a
similar tax credit for ethanol production. The Court was not convinced that Ohio
was encouraging the use of ethanol for health reasons. Rather, the Court
determined that the statute was related to economic protectionism. Accord West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (1994); Associated Indus.
v. Lohman, 114 S. Ct. 1815, 1820 (1994); Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of
Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (1994); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978). Congress, however, can sanction state rules that would
otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
1995] 325
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Because the Commerce Clause seeks to foster national economic
unity, state or municipal "[d]iscrimination against interstate
commerce in favor of local business is per se invalid, save in a
narrow class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate,
under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a
legitimate local interest." 8 The state must demonstrate that the
discrimination is justified by a legitimate factor unrelated to
economic protectionism,9 and that no less discriminatory
alternatives are available.1 0 "By contrast, non-discriminatory
regulations that have only incidental effects on interstate commerce
are valid unless 'the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."' 11
Unlike claims of racial and gender discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause, which require a determination of
112 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 (1992). See also H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S.
525, 539 (1949).
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and
every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he
will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home
embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by custom
duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look
to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect
him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such
has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality....
Id.
8. C & A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1683.
9. See Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2015
(1992) (finding that the state failed to show that the discrimination was justified
by concerns unrelated to economic protectionism); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502
U.S. 437, 457-58 (1992) (holding that Oklahoma failed to justify that the Act's
discrimination against out-of-state coal was unrelated to the States' economic
interests).
10. See New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278. "[A] State may validate a statute that
discriminates against interstate commerce by showing that it advances a
legitimate local purpose that can not be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives." Id. For a rare instance in which a state was able
to satisfy these stringent standards, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986),
holding a Maine statute valid even though it was discriminatory, since there was
a legitimate local purpose of protecting the ecology and there was a lack of
nondiscriminatory alternatives.
11. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1350 (quoting Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
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governmental intent, 12 a state or local law can be found to
discriminate against out-of-state commerce for Commerce Clause
purposes regardless of the legislative purpose, motive, or intent.
13
It is enough that the law draws a discriminatory line that
disadvantages out-of-state commerce or, if facially neutral, is
discriminatory in its practical operation and effect. 14 Further, the
Supreme Court has not been receptive to arguments that a state or
local law that discriminates against out-of-state commerce should
be saved because the law also discriminates against certain in-state
groups. 1
5
12. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979) ("[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a
racial [or gender group], it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose."); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its
face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater
proportion of one race than of another.").
13. See Associated Indus., 114 S. Ct. at 1824 (stating that the "court need
not inquire into the purpose or motivation behind a law to determine that in
actuality it impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce"); see also
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (stating that the "ultimate
legislative purpose need not be resolved, because its resolution would not be
relevant to the constitutional issue... "). For constitutional claims, there is
normally no meaningful distinction between legislative purpose, motive, and
intent.
14. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333 (1977). In Hunt, a North Carolina statute required all closed containers of
apples sold or shipped into the state to bear the applicable federal grade or be
identified by no grade. Although facially neutral, the statute had a predictable
direct effect of substantially discriminating against interstate commerce. Id. at
352.
15. See C & A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1682 ("The ordinance is no less
discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are also covered by the
prohibition."); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2025 (1992) ("[Merely because] the Michigan
statute allows individual counties to accept solid waste from out of state does
not qualify it as discriminatory character."); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340
U.S. 349, 354 n.4 (1951) ("It is immaterial that Wisconsin milk from outside the
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The Supreme Court's nondiscrimination principles are fully
applicable to state and local taxes. In fact, the Court has gone so far
as to say that "[o]nce a state tax is found to discriminate against
out-of-state commerce, it is typically struck down without further
inquiry." 16 Strong medicine indeed!
Lest the reader be too quick to conclude that the speaker has
strayed far from his usual focus upon the enforcement of individual
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,17 it should be remembered that the
Supreme Court resolved in 1991 that dormant Commerce Clause
claims may be asserted under section 1983.18 This means that
prevailing claimants may be able to recover their attorneys' fees
under the civil rights fee statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.19
II. CURRENT SUPREME COURT COMMERCE CLAUSE
TRENDS
The Court's decisions in C & A Carbone and Oregon Waste
Systems continue the line of Supreme Court decisions striking
16. Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2014 (1992).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
18. Dennis v. Higgins 498 U.S. 439, 440 (1991) (holding that claims for
violations of the Commerce Clause could be brought under § 1983).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (b) (West Supp. 1994). Section 1988 provides in
relevant part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-
318, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, or title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs.
328 [Vol 11
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down state and local waste disposal laws that discriminate against
interstate commerce.2 0 The saga started with the 1978 decision in
Philadelphia v. New Jersey,2 1 that a New Jersey statute that
prohibited the importation of waste which originated out-of-state
violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court found that
waste was an article of commerce and that, by allowing only waste
originating in-state to be disposed of in state landfills, the statute
discriminated against out-of-state commerce.2 2 Further, New
Jersey did not have a legitimate health interest which justified its
distinction between in and out-of-state waste.23 Although New
Jersey could impose a total ban on the disposal of waste in its
landfills, it could not discriminate between in and out-of-state
waste. "Put[ting] a gloss on Justice Cardozo's memorable
summation," in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,24 Professor Tribe
concluded that Philadelphia v. New Jersey stands for the
20. Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1355-56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("[Tjhe Court further cranks the dormant Commerce Clause ratchet against the
States by striking down such cost-based fees, and by so doing ties the hands of
the States .... "). It should be noted that the Chief Justice Rehnquist also
dissented in C & A Carbone.
21. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
22. Id. at 626-27.
23. Id. at 629. The Supreme Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey
distinguished the quarantine laws which have been upheld by the Supreme
Court in Shell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1907), on the ground that those laws
ban the shipment of noxious articles, like diseased livestock, into the state.
While quarantine laws burden out-of-state commerce, they do "not discriminate
against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevent[ ] traffic in noxious
articles, whatever their origin." 437 U.S. at 629. Since New Jersey allowed the
in-state disposal of waste, it could not claim
that the very movement of waste into or through New Jersey endangers
health, or that waste must be disposed of as soon and as close to its point
of generation as possible. The harms caused by waste are said to arise
after its disposal in landfill sites, and at that point... there is no basis to
distinguish out-of-state waste from domestic waste.
Id.
24. 294 U.S. 511, 523-24 (1935). In Baldwin, New York's attempt to
discourage the purchase of out-of-state milk was held to be discriminatory, since
its purpose was to protect New York's dairy industry.
1995] 329
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proposition that "'the peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together,' even in their collective garbage."'2 5
The Court followed Philadelphia v. New Jersey in two cases
decided in 1992. In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan
Department of Natural Resources,26 the Court invalidated a
Michigan statute that prohibited landfill operators from accepting
solid waste originating outside the county in which the facilities
operated.2 7 The statutory policy clearly discriminated against out-
of-state commerce. 2 8 The fact that the policy also discriminated
against waste originating in other Michigan counties was of no
moment.29 A state policy that discriminates against out-of-state
commerce will not be saved from constitutional doom because the
state chooses to disadvantage certain in-state groups as well.30
And, while Michigan could even-handedly "limit the amount of
waste that landfill operators may accept each year[,]" there was "no
valid health and safety reason for limiting the amount of waste that
a landfill operator may accept from outside the State, but not the
amount that the operator may accept from inside the State."'3 1
In Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt,32 the Court invalidated
an Alabama statute which imposed higher fees upon hazardous
waste generated outside the state than waste originating in state.33
The fee was payable by the waste disposal operator. The statute
facially discriminated against hazardous waste generated outside of
Alabama, and under Philadelphia v. New Jersey, was found to
violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Significantly, the Court
found that the state had a number of non-discriminatory
alternatives to alleviate its concerns about the volume of waste
entering the state, "not the least of which are a generally applicable
per-ton additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of within
25. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § § 6, 8, at 426
(2d ed. 1988) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)).
26. 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
27. Id. at 2027.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2025-26.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2027.
32. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
33. Id. at 2016-17.
[V4ol I11
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Alabama,... or a per-mile tax on all vehicles transporting
hazardous waste across Alabama roads,... or an even-handed cap
on the total tonnage landfilled. . . ."34 To the extent Alabama seeks
to further environmental, health, and safety concerns, it can
"regulate more closely the transportation and disposal of all
hazardous waste within its borders."'35 In addition, as Chief Justice
Rehnquist suggested in his dissenting opinion, "Alabama may,
under the market participation doctrine, open its own facility
catering only to Alabama customers.'" 36 There are, then, a number
of non-discriminatory methods that state and local government
may employ to solve their waste disposal problems.
III. FLOW CONTROL REGULATIONS
Although the Court's decisions identified a number of non-
discriminatory waste disposal options available to state and local
government, the decisions in C & A Carbone and Oregon Waste
Systems involved state and local policies which also discriminated
against interstate commerce. C & A Carbone concerned a "flow
control" ordinance adopted by the Town of Clarkstown, New
York, which required "all solid waste to be processed at a
34. Id. at 2015.
35. Id. at2016.
36. Id. at 2019 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (holding that the Commerce
Clause was not violated since the state was acting as a market participant
expending its own funds for construction contracts); Reeves v. State, 447 U.S.
429 (1980) (permitting a state owned cement plant to give a preference to the
sale of cement it produced solely to its residents as the state was acting as a
market participant and not as a market regulator); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (allowing a state bounty scheme to encourage the
removal of automobile hulks from Maryland streets and junkyards). The cited
cases support the conclusion that a state that participates in the market, rather
than regulates it, is exempt from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. See, eg.,
Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding
that the county which operated a landfill was exempt from dormant Commerce
Clause claims and was allowed to give preference to county residents), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990); see also Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1354
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designated transfer station before leaving the municipality."' 37 To
backtrack, in 1989, the town entered into a consent decree pursuant
to which it agreed to close its landfill and build a new solid waste
transfer station.38 "The station would receive bulk solid waste and
separate recyclable from nonrecyclable items. Recyclable waste
would be baled for shipment to a recycling facility; nonrecyclable
waste, to a suitable landfill or incinerator."'39
A private contractor agreed to build the transfer facility and
operate it for five years, after which it would be sold to the town
for one dollar.40 In order to finance the project, the town
guaranteed the contractor "a minimum waste flow of 120,000 tons
per year, for which the contractor could charge the hauler a so-
called tipping fee of $81 per ton."4 1 The town agreed to make up
any "tipping fee deficit."'4 2 In an attempt to meet the 120,000 ton
guarantee, a town ordinance provided that any trash in Clarkstown
must be delivered to the town's transfer facility for processing; it
prohibited the shipment of trash outside of Clarkstown unless it
was first processed at the Clarkstown transfer facility.4 3 "Over 20
states have enacted statutes authorizing local governments to adopt
flow control laws."'44
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, found that the
ordinance discriminated against interstate commerce because it
deprived out-of-state processing companies "of access to a local
market."' 45 The article of commerce at issue was best characterized







44. Id. at 1690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 1681. Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, found that
the ordinance did not discriminate against interstate commerce but rather, gave
"a waste processing monopoly to the transfer station." Id. at 1691 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Nevertheless, she found that the ordinance violated the dormant
Commerce Clause because it imposed an "excessive" burden on interstate
commerce. Id. at 1691 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter filed a
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun
joined. Id. at 1692 (Souter, J., dissenting).
332 [Vol I11
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 11 [2020], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss2/6
COMMERCE CLA USE DECISIONS
as the service of processing and disposing of solid waste.46 In
finding the ordinance unconstitutional, the Court relied upon a
consistent line of Supreme Court decisions finding state laws that
required in-state processing to violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.47 These laws generate business for in-state processors
while squelching out-of-state processors out of the local market.
The Clarkstown ordinance "hoards" solid waste for the local
processor.4 8 Although the Clarkstown ordinance differed from the
laws at issue in the Court's prior processing cases in that it favored
"a single local proprietor[,] this just [made] the protectionist effect
of the ordinance more acute."54
9
As in its other Commerce Clause waste disposal decisions, the
Court pointed out that the town had a number of non-
discriminatory alternatives to advance its interests. Health and
environmental concerns could be furthered with uniform non-
discriminatory safety regulations applicable to the Clarkstown
facility and competitors alike.50 As to the town's fiscal concerns,
the Court flatly declared that "revenue generation is not a local
interest that can justify discrimination against interstate
commerce. ' 5 1 Further, the town could finance its new facility
through general tax revenues or municipal bonds.
52
46. Id. at 1682.
47. Id at 1682-83. See South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82 (1984) (in-state processing of timber); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970) (in state packaging of cantaloupes); Foster-Fountain Packing
Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (in-state removal of shrimp heads and hulls);
Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (in-state inspection of meat).
48. C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1683.
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id at 1684.
52. Id "But having elected to use the open market to earn revenues for its
project, the town may not employ discriminatory regulation to give the project
an advantage over rival businesses from out of State." Id
1995]
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IV. FEE STRUCTURING AND COMPENSATORY
TAXATION POLICIES
The issue in Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of
Environmental Quality53 was very similar to that in Chemical
Waste Management v. Hunt.54  Like the Alabama statute
invalidated in Chemical Waste Management, Oregon levied higher
fees on landfill operators for solid waste generated out-of-state
than in state. While an eighty-five cent per ton fee was imposed for
in-state waste, a $2.25 per ton surcharge was imposed for waste
from other states.55 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Thomas, found that this fee structure discriminated against
interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause.56
In Chemical Waste Management, the Supreme Court left open
the possibility that discriminatory waste disposal charges might be
justified on the grounds of higher costs to a state from the disposal
of out-of-state waste.57 Oregon did not argue that the disposal of
waste from other states imposes higher costs on Oregon than the
disposed of in-state waste.5 8 Nor did Oregon argue that out-of-
state waste created a greater danger to health or safety. 59
Nevertheless Oregon argued that the surcharge imposed on out-of-
state waste was a valid compensatory tax.60 The classic
compensatory tax is a state's use tax imposed on goods purchased
out-of-state and used or stored in-state that compensates or
equalizes a substantially equivalent sales tax imposed upon goods
purchased in-state. 6 1 The idea is that while the use tax, in isolation,
53. 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994).
54. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
55. Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1348.
56. Id. at 1355. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Blackmun joined.
57. 112 S. Ct. at 2016 n.9.
58. Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1351.
59. Id. See Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2015 ("[T]here is
absolutely no evidence before this Court that waste generated outside Alabama
is more dangerous than waste generated in Alabama .....
60. Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1351.
61. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
334 [Vol I11
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discriminates against out-of-state commerce, substantial equality
may result when it is considered together with the sales tax.62 This
is not only the classic example, but the only tax upheld by the
Supreme Court "in recent memory under the compensatory tax
doctrine." 63
The Court had little trouble concluding that the $2.25 per ton
surcharge on out-of-state waste was not a compensatory tax. It
could not compensate for the substantially smaller eighty-five cent
per ton surcharge on in-state waste. Nor could it be said to
compensate for the state's income tax imposed upon in-state
earned income. Even if it were possible to quantify the general tax
burden attributable to in-state waste, the compensatory tax
argument failed "because the in-state and out-of-state levies are not
imposed on substantially equivalent events. ' 64 Taxes on earning
income and taxes imposed on disposing of waste at Oregon
landfills are simply "entirely different" taxes. 65
The compensatory tax doctrine was also at issue in Associated
Industries v. Lohman.66 In that case, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Thomas, unanimously ruled that Missouri's use tax
discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause in those municipalities where the use
tax exceeded the sales tax.67
We will simplify Missouri's sales and use taxation scheme
somewhat to illustrate the issue. Missouri imposed a 4% sales tax
upon goods purchased within the state and a 4% use tax on goods
62. As Justice Cardozo explained in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300
U.S. at 584, under a compensatory tax "the stranger from afar is subject to no
greater burden as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the gates.
The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the
sum is the same when the reckoning is closed." Id. at 584.
63. Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. CL at 1353. The Court has been reluctant "to
recognize new categories of compensatory taxes... ." Id.
64. Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1353.
65. Id. (quoting Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 546 n.11
(1983)). See Armco v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (ruling that
manufacturing and wholesaling are not substantially equivalent events).
66. 114 S. Ct. 1815 (1994).
67. Id. at 1821. All of the other Justices joined in Justice Thomas' opinion
except Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the judgment.
1995]
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purchased outside the state and used or stored within the state. No
problem, yet. Missouri, however, also imposed an "additional"
1.5% use tax that was not paired with any state sales tax. State law
authorizes municipalities to impose local sales taxes. "Over 1,000
localities have used that authority to enact sales taxes ranging from
0.5% to 3.5%, while at least one county has no local sales tax at
all."' 68 In some municipalities the "additional" 1.5% use tax
exceeded the local sales tax. This is what caused the discrimination
against out-of-state commerce.
Although Missouri argued that its "additional" use tax was
constitutional because it compensated for the local sales tax, in
fact, whether the use tax was equal or lower than the sales tax was
"a matter of fortuity, depending entirely upon the locality in which
the Missouri purchaser happens to reside. Where the use tax
exceeds the sales tax, the discrepancy imposes a discriminatory
burden on interstate commerce."6 9
The Court rejected Missouri's argument that it should evaluate
the equivalency of the use and sales taxes on an overall statewide
basis. This argument improperly assumed that discrimination
against interstate commerce in some parts of a state could be offset
by preferential treatment for interstate trade in other parts. Such an
approach violates the principle that for a tax to be compensatory,
the consumer must be free to make decisions free of the intra
versus inter state tax consequences of a transaction. 70
The fact that the discrimination against interstate commerce was
the direct result of municipal action, rather than state action, did
not call for a different remedy. Although a state may delegate its
taxing authority to local government, "it may not grant its political
subdivisions a power to discriminate against interstate commerce
that [the] State lacked in the first instance."
'7 1
68. Id. at 1819.
69. Id. at 1821.
70. Id. at 1823 (citing Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S.
318, 332 (1977)).
71. Associated Indus., 114 S. Ct. at 1824. The Court remanded the question
of the appropriate remedy to the state court. Id at 1825 (citing McKesson Corp.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990)). See
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993) (stating that while
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V. TAX ASSESSMENT - GIVE BACK PROVISIONS
Another aspect of a discriminatory state tax policy was at issue
in West Lynn Creamery v. Healy.72 That case dealt with a
Massachusetts tax assessment imposed upon milk dealers, both in-
state and out-of-state, who sell milk to Massachusetts retailers. In
fact, most of the milk sold to Massachusetts retailers was produced
out-of-state. Massachusetts then distributed all of the proceeds
from this assessment to Massachusetts dairy farmers. In an opinion
by Justice Stevens, the Court ruled that this "give back" provision
discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause.73
The Court found that the "avowed purpose" and effect of the
Massachusetts scheme was to enable higher cost Massachusetts
dairy farmers to compete with the lower cost out-of-state
farmers.74 Massachusetts argued that the Court should analyze the
taxation and rebate aspects separately. 75 It then urged that the tax
assessment was constitutional because it was imposed equally on
in and out-of-state dealers, and that the disbursements to in-state
farmers was valid because states may constitutionally grant
subsidies to local business interests.76  Clever, but not
constitutional.
The Court refused to analyze the two components separately.
Assuming that each component standing alone was non-
discriminatory and thus constitutional, it did not follow that the
same could be said for the entire scheme. It is true that "[a] pure
subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no
burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local
the state must make available a meaningful remedy, it retains flexibility in
responding to the finding that it has levied an unconstitutional discriminatory
tax).
72. 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
73. Id. at 2212. Justice Scalia filed a separate concurring opinion in which
Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring). Chief Justice
Rehnquist dissented in an opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined. Id. at
2221. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2212.
75. Id. at 2214.
76. Id. at 2214-15.
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business."' 77 The subsidy in West Lynn Creamery, however, was
funded principally from the sale of milk produced in other states.7 8
Thus, the state assisted local farmers by burdening interstate
commerce. This it may not do.
7 9
Massachusetts' other arguments were also meritless. To the
assertion that the milk dealers who pay the tax are not competitors
of the Massachusetts farmers who receive the subsidies, the Court
responded that 150 years of Supreme Court precedent holds that
"the imposition of a differential burden on any part of the stream of
commerce -- from wholesaler to retailer to consumer -- is invalid,
because a burden placed at any point will result in a disadvantage
to the out-of-state producer."' 80 Nor could the taxation scheme be
justified on the basis of Massachusetts' interest in saving its
financially distressed dairy industry from "collapse." Acceptance
of such an argument would effectively abrogate the principle of
nondiscrimination. "Preservation of local industry by protecting it
from the rigors of interstate commerce is the hallmark of economic
protectionism that the Commerce Clause prohibits. '8 1
CONCLUSION
Although state and local government enjoy great latitude in
devising mechanisms for solving their environmental and fiscal
problems, the Commerce Clause quartet makes clear that they may
not employ policies that discriminate against interstate commerce,
no matter how noble their purpose. As these four decisions
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2214.
79. The Court explained that, because the tax was coupled with a subsidy,
one of the most powerful groups that would ordinarily be expected to lobby
against the tax, Massachusetts dairy farmers, "were in fact its primary
supporters." Id. at 2215.
80. Id. at 2216. It could not be said that the tax scheme burdened only
Massachusetts consumers and milk dealers; it clearly impacted out-of-state
producers. Id. at 2216-17.
81. Id. at 2217.
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demonstrate, the Supreme Court vigorously enforces the principle
of nondiscrimination.
17
Schwartz: Commerce Clause Decisions
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 11 [2020], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss2/6
